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Safety and security are major concerns in the development of Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS). Signal temporal logic (STL) was proposed
as a language to specify and monitor the correctness of CPS relative
to formalized requirements. Incorporating STL into a development
process enables designers to automatically monitor and diagnose
traces, compute robustness estimates based on requirements, and
perform requirement falsification, leading to productivity gains in
verification and validation activities; however, in its current form
STL is agnostic to the input/output classification of signals, and
this negatively impacts the relevance of the analysis results.
In this paper we propose to make the interface explicit in the
STL language by introducing input/output signal declarations. We
then define new measures of input vacuity and output robustness
that better reflect the nature of the system and the specification in-
tent. The resulting framework, which we call interface-aware signal
temporal logic (IA-STL), aids verification and validation activities.
We demonstrate the benefits of IA-STL on several CPS analysis
activities: (1) robustness-driven sensitivity analysis, (2) falsification
and (3) fault localization. We describe an implementation of our en-
hancement to STL and associated notions of robustness and vacuity





for CPS verification and validation. We explore these methodologi-
cal improvements and evaluate our results on two examples from
the automotive domain: a benchmark powertrain control system
and a hydrogen fuel cell system.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Computingmethodologies→ Simulation evaluation; •Theory
of computation → Modal and temporal logics;
1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) combine computational and physical
components that interact with their environment via sensors and
actuators. These systems are complex and often used in mission-
critical applications. Verification and validation (V&V) for such
systems is an essential activity that ensures high standards of safety
and performance are met and sufficient correctness evidence is
gathered for regulatory bodies.
Runtime monitoring is a formal, yet pragmatic method for per-
forming analysis of individual system behaviors. When used at
design-time, runtime monitoring makes the V&V process more
systematic and rigorous, while remaining scalable (see [1] for an
overview). Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [2] is a specification for-
malism for expressing real-time temporal safety and performance
properties of CPS. In its standard, qualitative interpretation, STL
acts as a binary classifier that partitions behaviors according to
their satisfaction or violation of a specification.
Fainekos and Pappas proposed in [3, 4] to equip temporal logic
with a quantitative interpretation, whose adaptation to STL was
studied in [5]. This alternative semantics replaces the binary satis-
faction relation with a real-valued robustness degree indicating how
far an observed signal is from satisfying or violating the specifi-
cation. Monitoring STL with quantitative semantics can be done
efficiently [6] and is implemented in the Breach [7] and S-TaLiRo [8]
tools. These tools use robustness computations to perform falsifi-
cation [9, 10] and specification mining [11]. Falsification is a search-
based testingmethod that explores a system parameter-space to find
behaviors that violate a given specification. Specification mining
can be either seen as a process of learning full specifications [12, 13]
or as identifying parameters in specification templates [14–17].
Both approaches use robustness computations to guide the search
for tightest parameters or for most informative formulas.
One shortcoming of STL is that the standard procedure for mea-
suring the robustness of an observed behavior with respect to an
STL specification sometimes gives unexpected and nonintuitive
results. We illustrate this observation with the following scenario. A
verification engineer is evaluating the system-under-test S depicted
in Figure 1-(top). The system S receives requests and is expected
to respond to each request with a grant within 2 time units. We
say that there is a request (grant), whenever the signal req (gnt)
is above the threshold 4. We formalize this requirement with the
following STL specification: φ ≡ □((req ≥ 4) → ♢[0,2](gnt ≥ 4)).
The verification engineer designs a test input req consisting of a
train of requests, executes it on S and observes the system output
gnt. The signals req and gnt in the resulting trace w are depicted
in Figure 1-(bottom). These two signals witness the violation of
φ – inw the requests from req are never granted because gnt fails
to reach the expected threshold 4. In particular, we can observe
that gnt is 3 units away from reaching the expected threshold. As a
consequence, we expect the robustness degree, denoted by ρ(φ,w),
to be equal to −3, measuring how bad the system reaction is with
respect to the specification. Instead, the standard robustness of
[4, 5] implemented in S-TaLiRo and Breach gives us ρ(φ,w) = −1.
The reason for this counter-intuitive result is that, in this ex-
ample, the value of ρ(φ,w) relates to req; that is, the robustness
value −1 indicates that it suffices to reduce the amplitude of the
























Figure 1: Request-grant property: (top) system S and its test
environment, (bottom) signals req and gnt.
4, thus removing all requests fromw . Over signals that do not issue
any request, formula φ is vacuously satisfied. Thus the robustness
value in this case does not relate to how robust the system is when
measured at its output, but rather how close the input is to being
vacuous (how near it is to not exercising the system at all).
In this work, we propose an extension of STL that classifies sig-
nals as inputs and outputs. This simple, yet fundamental addition
to the temporal logic allows us to specify the system-under-test as
an input/output relation and not a set of correct execution traces.
Separating responsibilities between the system-under-test and its
environment is a key aspect of hierarchical system design [18], and
adding interface information to the specification is a significant
enhancement, from a methodological point of view. In particular,
the definition of the interface in a specification allows us to sepa-
rately reason about the quality of inputs (does the input exercise the
system in any meaningful way?) and the quality of outputs (how
good is the reaction of the system to the given input?). We develop
new notions of robustness and vacuity that capture the distance to
satisfaction and violation measured at the input and output of the
system separately, which we argue better capture the robustness of
a system. We demonstrate the benefits of interface-aware specifica-
tions and associated notions of robustness and vacuity on several
CPS analysis activities:
(1) Robustness-driven sensitivity analysis of CPS;
(2) Falsification-based testing;
(3) Robustness-guided fault localization and explanation.
For this last point we enhance the trace diagnostics algorithm of
[19] by adding some information relative to the robustness analysis,
and not just the pass/fail status of the property. This provides better
debugging information and makes the robustness analysis process
more transparent. We evaluate the results on one academic and
one industrial case study, where both examples come from the
automotive domain.
2 RELATEDWORK
We consider requirements that qualify a system in terms of its
input/output behavior, inspired by the ST-Lib library of specifi-
cations [20]. ST-Lib supports the formal specification of behavior
requirements for automotive control systems. This library includes
many of the types of performance and functional behaviors of in-
terest to engineers developing embedded control applications. In
particular, the library features STL formulas that capture overshoot,
settling times, rise times, and steady-state behaviors, and most in-
volve the interplay between input signals and expected response
(output) behaviors.
The distinction between environment assumptions and system
guarantees can help improve the performance of falsification in the
presence of potentially vacuous input signals. This problem was
studied in [21] for STL formulas of the form □(α → β) with the an-
tecedent α ranging over inputs and the consequent β ranging over
output signals. That work employs a Gaussian process regression
to estimate the region of the input space in which α holds with
high probability. A similar problem was addressed by Dokhanchi et
al. [22]. That work proposes to improve the falsification procedure
by first searching for a prefix input in which the antecedent α is
satisfied and then searching for a suffix input such that over the
corresponding output the consequent β is falsified. In both works
the specific structure of the formula is used to identify parts of the
specification related to input versus output. Our method provides
a more versatile solution: by enriching the specification language
with explicit signature declarations we are able to handle any spec-
ification that relates inputs to outputs, without any restriction on
the form of the specification.
The more general problem of vacuity as an assessment of the
quality of specifications has been studied in the context of discrete-
time temporal logics. Vacuity detection in temporal logic was first
studied in [23] for the ACTL fragment of CTL (computation tree
logic). The vacuity properties of CTL
∗
temporal specifications were
further studied in the context of model checking in [24]. The idea
of vacuity from model checking is extended to the testing setting
in [25] as a notion that complements test coverage. We adopt a more
practical approach, in which we define vacuity of the specification
only with respect to a concrete input signal.
Explaining a specification violation is another important aspect
of STL testing methodologies. Fault explanation in terms of tempo-
ral implicants, small segments of the observed behavior that witness
the violation, was proposed in [26]. That method uses standard STL
with qualitative semantics, and it neither captures input/output
relationships between signals nor identifies the explanation of the
worst case behavior. By contrast, our method uses both the in-
put/output signature of the specification and its robustness degree
to identify the precise subset of signals and time points that are
responsible for the observed robustness value.
2
3 INTERFACE-AWARE STL
We first provide an introduction to signal temporal logic (STL), and
then augment it with input/output declarations to arrive at an
enhanced version of the language, which we call interface-aware
STL (IA-STL). We then show how the interface information can be
used to make the STL robustness measure more meaningful. For
this, we first develop a notion of relative robustness that restricts
temporal logic robustness to a subset of signals. We use this general
notion of robustness to define two new measures in the context of
IA-STL, which we call output robustness and input vacuity. Finally
we study the properties of the new proposed notions and discuss
their intended use.
Syntax and Semantics. We start with some background definitions.
Let S = {s1, . . . , sn } be a set of signal variables. We define the time
domain T to be of the form [0,d] ⊂ R. A signal or trace w is a
function T → Rn , which we also see as a vector of real-valued
signals wi : T → R associated to variables si for i = 1, . . . ,n. In
the following we assume that everywi is piecewise monotone and
bounded.
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Given two signals u : T → Rl and v : T → Rm , we
define their parallel composition u∥v : T→ Rl+m in the expected
way. Given a signal w : T → Rn and variables R ⊆ S with R =
{si1 , . . . , sim } for some 1 ≤ i1 < . . . < im ≤ n, we define the
projection ofw onto R as follows:wR = wi1 ∥ . . . ∥wim .
Let Θ be a set of terms of the form f (R) where R ⊆ S are subsets
of variables and f : R |R | → R are interpreted functions. The syntax
of STL is given by the grammar
φ ::= ⊤ | f (R) > 0 | ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | φ1UI φ2 ,
where f (R) are terms in Θ and I are real intervals with bounds in
Q≥0 ∪ {∞}. As customary we use the shorthands ♢I φ ≡ ⊤UI φ
for eventually and □I φ ≡ ¬ ♢I ¬φ for always. The timing interval I
may be omitted when I = [0,∞) or I = (0,∞).
The semantics of STL is captured by the relation |= between a
time t , signalw , and formula φ, given by induction as follows:
(w, t) |= ⊤
(w, t) |= f (R) > 0 iff f (wR [t]) > 0
(w, t) |= ¬φ iff (w, t) |, φ
(w, t) |= φ1 ∨ φ2 iff (w, t) |= φ1 or (w, t) |= φ2
(w, t) |= φ1UI φ2 iff ∃t ′ ∈ t ⊕ I , (w, t ′) |= φ2 and
∀t ′′ ∈ (t , t ′), (w, t ′′) |= φ1 .
Here we use the symbol ⊕ to denote the Minkowski sum between
t and I , defined as follows: t ⊕ I = {t + a | a ∈ I }. We writew |= φ
when (w, 0) |= φ.
We now define interface-aware signal temporal logic (IA-STL),
by augmenting STL with input/output declarations. Formally, an
IA-STL specification is a tuple (X ,Y ,φ) such that X ∩Y = ∅, where
• φ is an STL formula over variables in S ;
• X ⊆ S is the set of the input variables;
• Y ⊆ S is the set of the output variables.
We remark that while desirable, we do not require the set of signals
to be partitioned into input and outputs, in that we allow for signals
in S \(X ∪Y ) that are neither input nor output. This may be relevant
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In practice, we assume piecewise linear or piecewise constant signals.
for internal state signals whose role is not clearly defined. This also
ensures backward compatibility and in general makes IA-STL a
conservative extension of STL.
Relative Robustness. We introduce a notion of robustness special-
ized according to two subsets of variables X ,Y ⊆ S such that
X ∩Y = ∅. Let φ be an STL formula andw a signal trace. We define
the X -robustness relative to Y , denoted ρYX (φ,w, t) by induction as
follows:
ρYX (⊤,w, t) = +∞
ρYX (f (R) > 0,w, t) =

0 if R ⊈ X ∪ Y
f (wR [t]) else if R ⊈ Y
sign(f (wR [t])) · ∞ otherwise
ρYX (¬φ,w, t) = −ρ
Y
X (φ,w, t)
ρYX (φ1 ∨ φ2,w, t) = max
{
















where for all a ∈ R, sign(a) · ∞ = +∞ if a > 0, −∞ otherwise.
We note that the standard STL robustness ρ as defined in [3, 5]
can be recovered by letting ρ(φ,w, t) = ρ ∅S (φ,w, t). The notion of
robustness that we define instead measures the robustness only on
the subset of variables X , relative to some variables Y . Variables in
X are measured, and their robustness is given by the terms they
appear in; variables in Y are considered fixed and their robustness
is taken to be infinite; variables neither inX nor inY are considered
to take arbitrary values, and their robustness is zero.
Output Robustness and Input Vacuity. We now specialize the notion
of relative robustness to the context of input and output signals.
Let (X ,Y ,φ) be an IA-STL specification.
• We call output robustness, denoted µ, the Y -robustness rela-
tive to S\Y . By definition µ(φ,w, t) ≡ ρ
S\Y
Y (φ,w, t).
• We call input vacuity, denoted ν , the X -robustness relative
to ∅. By definition ν (φ,w, t) ≡ ρ ∅X (φ,w, t).
Table 1: Possible combinations of output robustness and in-
put vacuity values, where k ∈ R≥0, and their meaning.
µ(φ,w) ν (φ,w) Interpretation
+∞ +k vacuously true
+k 0 nonvacuously true
−k 0 nonvacuously false
−∞ −k vacuously false
The output robustness represents the robustness of the specifi-
cation relative to the trace, measured at the output. When positive
(negative), it indicates by how much the output can be changed
without falsifying (satisfying) the formula for the given input.When
infinity (negative infinity), the output robustness indicates that φ
is vacuously satisfied (falsified) by the given input.
The input vacuity measure represents the level of vacuity of φ
with respect to the given input. When positive (negative) it indi-
cates by how much the input can be changed without falsifying
3
(satisfying) the formula, regardless of the output. When equal to 0,
the input vacuity indicates that the formula is non-vacuously true
or false, based on tracew .
Table 1 summarizes the meaning of possible combinations of
input vacuity and output robustness.
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We verify that, by construction, the vacuity ofφ relative tow only
depends on input variables X . Consider an IA-STL specification
(X ,Y ,φ) and let us assume without loss of generality that X is of
the form {s1, . . . , sm }.
Proposition 3.1. For any t ∈ T, u : T → Rm and v,v ′ : T →
Rn−m we have ν (φ,u∥v, t) = ν (φ,u∥v ′, t).
Thus in the following for u = wX , we freely write ν (φ,u, t) in
place of ν (φ,w, t).
We motivate the definitions of input vacuity and output robust-
ness in the following Examples 3.2 and 3.3 by comparing these
notions to the classical notion of robustness from [3, 5].
Example 3.2. We consider the formula φ from Section 1 in which
req is declared as an input and gnt as an output signal, as well as
the tracew from Figure 1-(bottom). Using traditional robustness,
ρ(φ,w) = −1 — instead of measuring how far the system is from
generating a valid grant, traditional robustness measures the quality
of the request. The value can be interpreted as the cheapest way to
satisfy φ by lowering the signal req by 1 and effectively removing
all requests. In contrast, µ(φ,w) = −3 represents the measure of
how far the system is from responding to the requests by valid
grants.
Example 3.3. In this example, we study again the bounded re-
sponse property φ from Section 1, and we evaluate it on the tracew
from Figure 2. We first note that the output robustness µ(φ,w) = ∞,
indicating vacuous satisfaction of φ. In other words, there is no
modification of gnt that can result in the violation of φ for the
given fixed input req. In order to measure the level of vacuity of
φ with respect to req, we use instead input vacuity, which yields
ν (φ,w) = 2. This measure means that any change in req smaller
than 2 preserves vacuous satisfaction of φ.
Properties. Let us now formally establish the relation between input
vacuity and output robustness on the one hand and some distance
measures on the other hand. The results that we present also justify
and explain the classification of Table 1. In more detail, we define
two notions of distances between traces: based on input signals
alone, and based on output signals for a fixed input. From these
we derive notions of distances between a trace and a formula, seen
as the (Hausdorff) distance to the nearest trace that satisfies the
formula. These distances provide semantic, hence precise, counter-
parts of input vacuity and output robustness measures.
Let u,u ′ : T→ Rm be signals over variables {s1, . . . , sm }. The
absolute distance d(u,u ′) is defined as follows:
d(u,u ′) = sup
t ∈T,f (R)∈Θ,v :T→Rn−m
| f ((u ′∥v)R [t]) − f ((u∥v)R [t])| .
2
We remark that the meaning of µ(φ, w ) = ν (φ, w ) = 0 is ambiguous, since it
can be interpreted as w satisfying or falsifying φ . This is related to the fact that in
general the satisfaction/violation boundary may feature both satisfying and falsifying
traces, so that borderline traces cannot be classified. We omit from the table the cases
µ(φ, w ) = ν (φ, w ) = ±∞ as they can only happen when measuring robustness with
formulas that are obvious tautologies and contradictions built using subformula ⊤,
and are consequently of no practical interest.
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Figure 2: Vacuously satisfied request-grant property with
signals req and gnt.
The absolute distance from u to some formula φ at time t , denoted
d(φ,u, t), is defined as follows:
d(φ,u, t) = inf
u′:T→Rm, v :T→Rn−m
(u′ ∥v,t ) |=φ
d(u ′∥v,u∥v) .
Letv,v ′ : T→ Rn−m be signals over variables {sm+1, . . . , sn }. The
distance du (v,v




| f ((u∥v ′)R [t]) − f ((u∥v)R [t])| .
The distance from u to some formula φ relative to v at time t ,
denoted dv (φ,u, t), is defined as follows:
dv (φ,u, t) = inf
u′:T→Rm
(u′ ∥v,t ) |=φ
d(u ′∥v,u∥v) .
We next consider an IA-STL specification (X ,Y ,φ) and assume
without loss of generality that X is of the form {s1, . . . , sm }. We
first show that the input vacuity ν (φ,u, t) for input signalu is a safe
approximation of the absolute distance from u to φ (or ¬φ).
Lemma 3.4. Let u : T→ Rm be a signal and t be a time. We have
−d(φ,u, t) ≤ ν (φ,u, t) ≤ d(¬φ,u, t).
As a result, ν captures the vacuity condition of the formula
relative to the input signal and measures its level:
Theorem 3.5. Let u : T→ Rm be a signal.
• If ν (φ,u) > 0 then u∥v |= φ for all v : T→ Rn−m ;
• If ν (φ,u) < 0 then u∥v |, φ for all v : T→ Rn−m .
Theorem 3.6. Let u,u ′ : T→ Rm be signals such that d(u,u ′) <
|ν (φ,u)|. We have u ′∥v |= φ iff for all v : T→ Rn−m , u∥v |= φ.
Next, we show that the output robustness µ(φ,w, t) is a safe
approximation of the distance from u to φ (or ¬φ) relative to v .
Lemma 3.7. Let u : T→ Rm and v : T→ Rn−m be signals and t
be a time. We have −du (φ,v, t) ≤ µ(φ,u∥v, t) ≤ du (¬φ,v, t).
As a result, µ captures the satisfaction status of the formula for
the combined input and output signals and measures the robustness
of the formula in terms of the output signal:
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Theorem 3.8. Letw : T→ Rn be a signal.
• If µ(φ,w) > 0 thenw |= φ;
• If µ(φ,w) < 0 thenw |, φ.
Theorem 3.9. Let u : T→ Rm and v,v ′ : T→ Rn−m be signals
such that du (v,v ′) < |µ(φ,u∥v)|. We have u∥v |= φ iff u∥v ′ |= φ.
Discussion. Request-response specifications of the form □(α → β)
are commonly used to describe CPS requirements. The notion of
vacuity in [22] is restricted to the above form. In this view, a vacuous
trace is one that satisfies □(¬α), such that the request condition
never being satisfied creates no response obligation.
Observe that it is not necessarily the case that α and β respec-
tively range over input and output variables. Let x be an input andy
an output signal. The specifications □((x ≥ 0∧y ≥ 0) ⇒ □[0,2](y ≤
5)) and □(y ≥ 0 ⇒ □[0,2](y ≤ 5)) are both natural examples of
request-response properties in which the future output obligations
do not depend (only) on inputs, but (also) on the current state of the
output. In these cases, our input vacuity measure is complementary
to the definition of vacuity from [22]. Our notions of output ro-
bustness and input vacuity are general and can meaningfully apply
to any STL formula conjoined with input and output declarations
regardless of its syntactic form or semantic characteristics.
Signal variables can refer to quantities expressed in different
units of measurement, and the corresponding signal units influence
the robustness computation. In particular, the robustness value of
a specification referring to multiple signal variables with differ-
ent units is typically dominated by one of the signal variables. A
change in the measurement unit of that signal variable can drasti-
cally change to robustness value by changing the variable values
dominating the computation. This problem is orthogonal to the
input/output characterization of signal variables, yet we remark
that the notion of relative robustness that we introduce in this work
provides the means to address this problem. In particular, relative
robustness enables studying the effect of individual signals on the
overall robustness with respect to a specification.
The relative robustness can also be used to define symmetrical
notions of input robustness and output vacuity. The input robustness
measures the robustness of the system in terms of margins at the
input, for a fixed output. The output vacuity observes a vacuity
condition related to the output obligations holding in the absence of
input stimuli. We will refrain from further elaboration on these no-
tions, as we found these measures less intuitive and less applicable
as compared to the output robustness and input vacuity notions.
4 ROBUSTNESS-GUIDED TRACE
DIAGNOSTICS
In this section, we present a two-part trace diagnostic procedure.
The first part of the procedure is novel, we call it worst-case di-
agnostics. It marks the point (or set of points) corresponding to
the worst-case value in the trace relative to the specification. The
second part of the procedure is known from [19] as epoch diagnostic.
It provides additional context, by highlighting all parts of the trace
contributing to the violation/satisfaction.
Worst-Case Diagnostics. Wedefine a procedure that, given a formula
φ and tracew , returns the time(s) and signal variable(s) from which
the robustness value ρ(φ,w) originates. This worst-case diagnostics,
denotedDρ , is obtained by induction on the structure of the formula
and on time, based on the robustness values given by ρ. The operator
Dρ takes as argument a formula φ, trace w and time t ∈ T, and
returns a (set of) pair(s) in T×S , where S = {s1, . . . , sn } is the set of
variables. It provides the time(s) and signal variable(s) that witness
the robustness value of formula φ. Operator Dρ is defined relative
to some robustness indicator ρ that we take to be either µ, ν , or
the standard robustness indicator of [3, 5]. For a given tracew , the
worst-case diagnostics is computed by induction on the structure
of the formula φ and on time t as follows. We let
Dρ (⊤,w, t) = ∅
Dρ (f (R) > 0,w, t) = {(t , r ) | r ∈ R}
Dρ (¬φ,w, t) = Dρ (φ,w, t)
Dρ (φ ∨ψ ,w, t) =

Dρ (φ,w, t) if ρ(φ,w, t) > ρ(ψ ,w, t)
Dρ (ψ ,w, t) if ρ(φ,w, t) < ρ(ψ ,w, t)
Dρ (φ,w, t) ∪ Dρ (ψ ,w, t) otherwise
Dρ (φUI ψ ,w, t) =

Dρ (φ,w,τφ ) if ρ(φ,w,τφ ) < ρ(ψ ,w,τψ )
Dρ (ψ ,w,τψ ) if ρ(φ,w,τφ ) > ρ(ψ ,w,τψ )
Dρ (φ,w,τφ ) ∪ Dρ (ψ ,w,τψ ) otherwise ,
where τψ = argmaxt ′∈t ⊕I min{ρ(ψ ,w, t
′), inft ′′∈(t,t ′) ρ(φ,w, t
′′)}
and τφ = argmint ′′∈(t,τψ ) ρ(φ,w, t
′′).3 We then let Dρ (φ,w) =
Dρ (φ,w, 0).
The following proposition makes it precise in what sense we can
say that the worst-case diagnostics witnesses the robustness value
ofw relative to φ. Here cl(φ) denotes the closure of φ, meaning φ
and all of its sub-formulas.
Proposition 4.1. Let w be a signal and φ a formula. For all
(t , r ) ∈ Dρ (φ,w), there exists f (R) > 0 ∈ cl(φ) such that r ∈ R
and |ρ(φ,w)| = |ρ(f (R) > 0,w, t)|.
Epoch Diagnostics. The epoch diagnostics procedure of [19] is based
on the notion of temporal implicant of [26]. Informally, a temporal
implicant is a property of the tracew that is a subset of the trace
that entails φ. Whenw |, φ, to explain the violation of φ byw one
uses instead an implicant of ¬φ.
We recover the epoch diagnostic by considering the characteristic
function χ (φ,w, t) ∈ {0, 1}, defined by χ (φ,w, t) = 1 iff (w, t) |= φ.
The epoch diagnostic is then obtained as Dχ (φ,w).
Example 4.2. We illustrate the combined worst-case and epoch
trace diagnostics procedure with the STL specification φ from Sec-
tion 1. We depict a signal that violates φ with diagnostics infor-
mation overlaid in Figure 3. The worst-case diagnostics depends
on the notion of robustness used. The circle and square markings
denote the outcome of the worst case robustness procedure guided
by the classical robustness and by the output robustness, respec-
tively. In this instance, the epoch diagnostics indicates two periods
responsible for the violation on each signal and the worst-case diag-
nostics indicates the following. The value of the classical robustness
comes from the req signal during the first period, while the value
3
In general, τψ is a set thus Dρ (φ, w, τψ ) stands for the union of Dρ (φ, w, t ′) for
all t ′ in τψ while ρ(ψ , w, τψ ) stands for the value of ρ(ψ , w, t ′) for any t ′ in τψ .
The same remark applies to τφ , Dρ (φ, w, τφ ) and ρ(φ, w, τφ ). The times at which
we perform the diagnostics and evaluate the robustness may include limit points t+
and t− for t ∈ T, as maxima and minima are sometimes found in the limit.
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Figure 3: Combined epoch andworst-case diagnostics for the
specification φ.
of the output robustness comes from gnt signal during the second
period. The lightly shaded regions are the result of the epoch diag-
nostics computation and are independent of various definitions of
robustness.
Discussion. The worst-case diagnostics procedure presented in this
section is orthogonal to the notion of interface-aware specifications.
A shortcoming of temporal logic robustness indicators, as argued
in Section 1, is their opacity as to which signals are responsible for
the observed robustness value. In Section 3, we partly remedied
this situation by enabling the designer to provide a priori a subset
of signal variables over which the robustness should be measured.
This is particularly relevant when the specification describes an
input/output relation, because of the different ways tolerance mar-
gins relate to the system robustness in that case. The worst-case
trace diagnostics makes the robustness computation even more
transparent by providing a posteriori signal variable(s) and time(s)
from which the robustness value derives.
For interface-aware specifications the worst-case diagnostics
makes it possible to identify input and output states that are re-
sponsible for a given input vacuity condition or output robustness
value. A single time-variable pair may not be self-explanatory, and
we chose to combine it with the epoch diagnostics of [19]. The epoch
diagnostics provides additional context by highlighting which parts
of the signal trace contribute to the observed violation. We believe
the combined information of epoch and worst-case diagnostics
increases the usability of interface-aware robustness indicators.
5 APPLICATIONS AND EVALUATION
We implemented in Breach (1) the STL language extension, adding
the ability to declare the input/output interface of the specifica-
tion, (2) procedures for computing the output robustness and input
vacuity, (3) a procedure for computing combined epoch and worst-
case fault explanation. Below we describe applications of IA-STL to
address several common engineering tasks for two different model-
based applications. The first application is a powertrain control
(PTC) system. We use this publicly-available benchmark model
to explore different uses of IA-STL and illustrate its benefits. The
second application is a system model based on an automotive, hy-
drogen fuel cell (FC) system. We use this proprietary industrial
model to validate the proposed approach.
5.1 Powertrain Benchmark System
The powertrain control (PTC) benchmark model, described in detail
in [27], represents the dynamics associated with the control of
the engine air path for an internal combustion engine used in an
automobile. The air path model captures the dynamics of the air
and fuel that pass into the engine, effects of combustion, and the
expulsion of exhaust gases. A computer controller regulates the
amount of air and fuel injected into the engine cylinders; the goal is
to accurately control the ratio of air-to-fuel that enters the cylinders.
Accurate control of this system is critical to ensure overall vehicle
efficiency, to regulate the hydrocarbon emissions, and to maintain
a high quality of vehicle response — the so-called driveability. The
model is amean-value engine model, meaning that it represents the
dynamics of the fuel and air processes that take place in the engine
cylinders across several combustion cycles; it does not represent
individual combustion events that occur in the cylinders.
Inputs to the PTC air path system are accelerator pedal angle
θin and engine speed ω. The output from the system model is the
measured air-to-fuel ratio λ. Consider an overshoot requirement
for the PTC system, adapted from the one described in [20]:
φovershoot ≡ □[a,+∞)((θ
′
in −θin > c) ⇒ □[0,b](|λ−λref | < γ ·λref )) .
Here γ defines the maximum allowed overshoot value relative to
the reference value λref , and c is a threshold value used to deter-
mine when θin produces a step input. The additional input signal θ ′in
is shorthand for the value of θin shifted by d time units, such that
θ ′in[t] = θin[t +d] for all t . The antecedent clause of the implication
in φovershoot determines when a step occurs in the input, using a
small time delay d to decide whether the input is in a step condition.
The consequent clause indicates that the amount by which the
output λ overshoots the reference value λref should not exceed γ
times the reference value. Here, b is the period over which the over-
shoot value should be monitored after a step in input is experienced.
Note that the property is only checked after time t = a; before this
time the system is in a transient state. For our experiments, we use
γ = 0.01, λref = 14.7, a = 10.0 sec., b = 2.0 sec., c = 10.0 deg., and
d = 0.1 sec.
5.1.1 Robustness computation. We illustrate the difference between
classical robustness, output robustness, and input vacuity on the
PTC model. Figure 4 depicts a behavior of the PTC model, which
satisfies the specification φovershoot with:
• Classical robustness: 0.08;
• Output robustness:∞;
• Input vacuity: 0.05.
We observe that the classical robustness measures how far λ is
from reaching the overshoot condition. We recall that there is no
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Figure 4: PTC robustness - an example of vacuity.
overshoot when |λ−λref | < λref ·γ . The maximal value of λ during
the disturbance is 14.767. It is easy to see that λ is 0.08 away from
an overshoot, the value reported by the classical robustness.
However, this value is misleading. If we observe closer the input
θin, we can notice that steps go from 0.0 to 9.95, instead of going to
10.0, as required by the specification. As a result, no obligation is
triggered in the output and the specification is vacuously satisfied by
the input. In other words, with this specific input, the specification
is guaranteed to hold regardless of what is observed in the output.
This fact is appropriately reflected by the ∞ value of the output
robustness. Finally, input vacuity of 0.05 indicates that a change of
at least 0.05 in θin is needed to trigger any obligation in the output.
We remark that in this example, the classical robustness differs
from both the output robustness and the input vacuity. In fact, it
coincides with the value of the output vacuity measure that we
mention in Section 3. Intuitively, the output vacuity measures the
strength of the output with respect to the specification regardless
of the input (and its vacuity). We believe that all such robustness
measures are independent, in that there are situations where they
all differ from each other on the same formula-trace pair.
5.1.2 Falsification. As the next application of IA-STL, we consider
the falsification problem. Given the specification φovershoot and the
system model, the task is to identify an input signal θin that results
in behaviors that do not satisfy φovershoot . We assume the class of
input signals for θin to be piecewise constant signals with two dis-
continuities. The falsification problem consists in solving a search
problem over two decision variables to identify a behavior that does
not satisfy φovershoot . We restrict the search to a maximum of 100
iterations.
In the first experiment, we initialize the input signal θin to a
step signal that rises from 0 to 10.1 degrees. This input satisfies the
left-hand side of the implication in φovershoot and non-vacuously
exercises the requirement. We run two instances of the falsification
problem with this initial condition. In the first instance, the cost
function is the classical robustness, and in the second instance,
the cost function is the output robustness. In this experiment, the
classical robustness value is dominated by the output signal λ, and
the two robustness measures coincide. As a consequence, the two
falsification problem instances yield the identical result, identifying
the same input that leads the system to violate the specification.
In the second experiment, we change the unit of θin from de-
grees to revolutions, where 1 revolution equals 360 degrees, and
we scale the threshold c accordingly to c = 10
360
= 0.028. We note
that the change of units does not affect the meaning of the specifi-
cation in any way. We repeat the two falsification instances from
the first experiment, and we observe an interesting phenomenon.
The classical robustness applied to the initial simulation is now
dominated by the measurements over the input θin and is equal to
0.028. This value corresponds to the segments of the input where
θin equals to 0, and in these parts of the behavior, the implication in
φovershoot is satisfied and is exactly c = 0.028 away from violating
the property. In fact, the classical robustness is dominated by the
0.028 measurement over the input, regardless of the size of the
input step. The optimizer tries to find a good search direction by
varying the size of the step but remains stuck in a plateau and is
hence not able to find a violating trace. This is exposed by our ex-
perimental results, shown in Figure 5-(left), where all 100 iterations














































Figure 5: PTC falsification with (left) classical robustness
and (right) output robustness as cost function.
In contrast, the falsification instance that uses the output robust-
ness as its cost function ignores the quantitative measurements
over the input. It appears to follow a gradient that eventually leads
to a violating trace after 88 iterations of the falsification algorithm,
as shown in Figure 5-(right).
5.1.3 Fault localization. In this section, we illustrate our combined
epoch and worst-case fault explanation procedure applied to the
PTC system. Figure 6 shows a trace in which the joint behavior of
θin and λ lead to the violation of the overshoot requirement, yielding
an output robustness of −0.203. The epoch trace explanation marks
in the simulation trace a step in the pedal angle θin and the ensuing
overshoot region in λ, occurring within 2.0 sec. The worst-case
fault explanation identifies the worst-case of the overshoot with the
red box, marking the time where λ reaches 15.05. This is the exact
point in time where the absolute difference between λ and λref is
|15.05 − 14.7| = 0.35, which is by 0.203 higher than the allowed
value of γ · λref = 14.7 · 0.01 = 0.147.
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Figure 6: PTC fault explanation with zoom in on the worst
behavior.
5.2 Fuel Cell System
The air path controller for the automotive hydrogen fuel cell (FC)
system is a complex model made for a production development
with close to 4,000 blocks and 400 discrete and continuous states.
It is described in [28]. The FC system uses a mixture of air and
hydrogen to produce electrical power. The FC stack is a system
that takes hydrogen gas and air as input and produces electrical
energy, which is used to charge the battery and power the motor.
The air path controller is used to regulate how much air enters
the FC stack. More precisely, the job of the air path controller is to
regulate the amount of volumetric air flow and air pressure that is
imparted to the FC stack. Accurate regulation is required to ensure
sufficient power output from the FC stack and to ensure a high
level of performance (driveability) from the vehicle.
The expected behavior is specified with 23 STL requirements.
4
In this section, we illustrate our results on a requirement R that
specifies a criterion on how much a control system response is
allowed to deviate from a reference behavior. The control system is
given the signal request REQUEST and generates a response signal
RESPONSE. Whenever a specific condition on the request signal
occurs, represented by the Boolean predicate cond(REQUEST), the
value of the signal RESPONSE is checked against its associated
reference signal CRITERIA. The STL requirement is given by
φ ≡ □(CHECK_FLAG→ RESPONSE ≥ CRITERIA) ,
where CHECK_FLAG ≡ cond(REQUEST).
5.2.1 Robustness Sensitivity Analysis with Heat Maps. The model
of the air path controller is parameterized with three parameters
p1, p2 and p3. These parameters affect the controller behavior and
consequently the degree to which the controller satisfies or violates
4
Details regarding the requirements, physical meaning of signals, and units are sup-
pressed for proprietary reasons.
its requirements. Given parameter values a, b and c of p1, p2 and
p3, we denote byw
(a,b,c)
the signal resulting from the simulation
of the system model with these parameter values.
The sensitivity of the model robustness to its requirements is
studied by uniformly varying these three parameters, simulating
the model for each combination of parameters and monitoring the
simulation outcomes against the STL requirements. Figure 7 shows
a 3D scatter plot, where each point denotes the satisfaction/violation
status of φ for the given simulation trace and the parameter values.
Figure 7: Satisfaction/violation of φ for specific combina-
tions of parameter values.
In addition to the qualitative impact of parameter variation to the
satisfaction of φ, one can perform a more quantitative sensitivity
analysis by calculating the robustness degree of the simulation re-
sults with respect to the specification for each choice of parameter
values. The heat map obtained by computing the robustness degree
ρ(φ,w(a,b,90)) is shown in Figure 8. Neither the scatter plot nor
the heat map informs us about the robustness of the FC system.
This is because the unitless Boolean input CHECK_FLAG with a
normalized range of 1.0 dominates the computation. T is 1.0: the re-
ported overall robustness is either 0.5 ifw(a,b,90) satisfies φ, or −0.5
otherwise. One way to circumvent the problem is to manually scale
input signals so that they do not dominate the computation. Instead
we provide a general solution to this problem via the appropriate
notion of output robustness.
We repeat the same experiment in which we declare REQUEST
as an input and RESPONSE as an output signal, and compute the
relative output robustness µ(φ,w(a,b,90)). Figure 9 shows the re-
sulting heat map. We can see that the output robustness measures
the quality of the system output, providing more interesting and
intuitive information about the system performance.
5.2.2 Fault localization. In this section we validate the enhanced
fault localization method on the FC model. For demonstration pur-
poses we choose a simulation trace that violates the requirement
φ and contrast the impact of the robustness measure on the fault
localization procedure.
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Figure 8: Heatmap for the Fuel Cell system, requirement R
and p3 = 90, using classical STL robustness computation.
Figure 9: Heatmap for the Fuel Cell system, requirement R
and p3 = 90, using IA-STL output robustness computation.
Figure 10 depicts the outcome of the fault localization when
worst-case diagnostics is driven by classical STL robustness. The
overall robustness value is dominated by the Boolean input, hence
the fault localization procedure identifies points in the input as
reasons for the worst-case robustness.
By contrast, combining fault localization with the IA-STL output
robustness, as shown in Figure 11, allows our fault localization pro-
cedure to correctly identify the precise time point that is responsible
for the worst-case deviation of the output from the reference.
5.2.3 Falsification. Finally, we illustrate the potential benefits of
using the IA-STL output robustness computation to drive a falsifica-
tion procedure. We compare falsification results performed with the
traditional STL robustness and enhanced IA-STL output robustness
computations. We fix an input trace for an FC system model and
vary the system parameters p1, p2 and p3 to attempt to falsify the
requirement φ. For both cases, we use a search procedure based
Figure 10: Fault localization, driven by traditional STL robus-
ntess.




local search optimizer fmincon. The search pro-
cedure as implemented in Breach uses a combination of the local
search method provided by fmincon with random restarts when a
local optimum is detected.
Figure 12-(left) illustrates the falsification results using tradi-
tional falsification robustness computations. The figure shows the
evolution of the STL robustness across many iterations of the search
procedure. We can observe that the solver either exhibits the hall-
marks of random restarts (discontinuities) or is flat. Also, the ma-
jority of the flat regions are at the 0.5 value; this is due to the fact
that the Boolean input dominates the robustness value when com-
puted using the traditional method. This value does not convey
information about the behavior of the system output.
By contrast, consider the results of the falsification procedure
using the IA-STL output robustness computations, as shown in
9
Figure 12: Falsifcation results, using classical STL (left) and
output IA-STL (right) robustness.
Figure 12-(right). We can see in the figure that there appear to be
fewer random restarts.
Despite the fact that we do not falsify the property using either
traditional STL robustness or the enhanced version, the above ex-
ample demonstrates that the STL output robustness computation
provides more meaningful cost information that could potentially
be exploited by an appropriate solver to better guide the search.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we enhanced signal temporal logic (STL) with support
to define input-output interfaces. We adapted robustness compu-
tations to exploit this interface and consequently provide deeper
insights into the system behaviors with respect to their specifi-
cations. We demonstrated the value of the enhanced robustness
notions by using them to perform three analysis activities: robust-
ness sensitivity analysis, fault localization, and search-based testing.
We illustrated these analysis approaches on two examples, includ-
ing an industrial automotive fuel cell system.
We plan to extend the presented work in several directions. The
input/output signature is a natural pre-requisite for compositional
reasoning about the system and its requirements. We will in par-
ticular study how we can leverage IA-STL to do compositional
testing. We have seen that output robustness can be used to pre-
cisely identify portions of the input and output signals that explain
the violation of a specification. We will study how this information
could be used to explain the reason for the violation in terms of the
system model.
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